In this paper we extend the influence diagram (ID) representation for decisions under uncertainty. In the standard ID, arr ows into a decision node are only infonnational; they do not represent constraints on what the decision maker can do. We can represent such constraints only indirectly, using arr ows to the children of the decision and sometimes adding more variables to the influence diagram, thus making the ID more complicated. Users of influence diagrams often want to represent constraints by arrows into decision nodes. We represent constraints on decisions by allowing relevance arrows into decisions nodes. We call the resulting representation information/relevance influence diagrams (IRIDs).
INTRODUCTION
In this paper we introduce a variation on influence diagrams that allows the use of arr ows into decision nodes to represent constraints as well as information. We call this new representation an Information I Relevance Influence Diagram (IRID) . In an IRID, we model a decision variable that is constrained by other variables by drawing relevance arr ows from the other variables to the decision variable. But we also still allow purely infonnational arro ws into decision nodes.
Information/relevance influence diagrams allow for direct representation and specification of constrained decisions. This representation is a partial solution to the broader problem of representing and solving asymmetric decision problems. Asymmetry in decision problems occ urs when some values of decision and/or chance variables are not allowed given certain values of their predecessors.
Recent works by Smith et al. (1993) , and all the references therein offer a more complete treatment of this problem. However, none of them provide a direct and explicit representation of asymmetries concerning decision variables.
The advantage of our representation lies in the solution method we use to evaluate !RIDs. This method is a combination of stochastic dynamic programming and Gibbs sampling, an iterative Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm (Jenzarli, 1995) . This method allows us to model asymmetries concerning chance variables by using zero-one conditionals. Our solution method is especially useful when exact methods for solving influence diagrams fail.
In this paper we assume that the reader is already familiar with directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), and belief networks (Pearl, 1988) . Briefly, we defme a BN as a DAG in which nodes represent variables, together with a specification for each variable of a conditional probability distribution for that variable given its parents. (If there are no parents, this is a marginal probability distribution for the variable.) It is assumed that the joint probability distribution of the variables is the product of these conditional probability distributions.
We also assume that the reader is already familiar with Markov chain Monte Carlo (Hastings, 1970) and Gibbs sampling (Geman and Geman, 1984; and Gelfand and Smith, 1990) .
We organize this paper as follows. In Section 2 we review influence diagrams (IDs) and their properties. In Section 3 we describe solutions algorithms for IDs. In Section 4 we describe infonnation/relevance influence diagrams. In Section 5 we adapt the Gibbs sampling algorithm of Jenzarli (1995) to !RIDs and illustrate with an example.
INFLUENCE DIAGRAMS
In this section we review influence diagrams (IDs) and their properties. We describe the assumptions on which the ID decision model is based. And, we conclude with a note on randomization. We use a numerical example to illusttate ideas and concepts where appropriate. Chance variables in an ID are interpreted just as they are in a BN. The conditional probability P(X=xjX1 =x1 ,X 2 =x2 , ... , ?'t =xt } .
(1) that we specify for a chance vartable X mdtcates our belief that X will take the value x when its parents , the X i , take the values X i . For the sake of generality , we will not rule out the possibility that the values of the conditional probability are unaffected as we change some of the X i . By drawing arr ows to X from all the X i we signal that we think X depends on them all , and that we expect to specify values for (1) that do depend on them all. But if assessment of the probabilities follows the construction of the DAG , this expectation may fail to be fulfilled. In Figure 1 the chance variable R depends on the values of the decision variable T and the chance variable 0. The conditional probability distribution of R given T and 0 is shown in Table 2 . Notice that the conditional probability of R given T = nt and 0 remains unchanged whether 0 = worO= y. Table 2 . Conditional probability distribution of R given TandO The decision maker can be asked to supply in advance a policy for the decision at each decision v�ble .t. . This policy usually takes the form of a s p ectficatton of a decision alternative for each configuration of the parents of the decision variable. For example , in Figure 1 , when the oil wildcatter must decide whether to drill or not drill , he does so knowing his earlier choice at the decision variable T as well as the value of the chance variable R.
The result of such a policy can be interpreted as a conditional for Ji given its parents. This conditional gives only probabilities of zero and one: The decision maker may, if he or she wants, adopt a policy that makes the conditional for a decision variable depend on only some or none of its parents. For example, the wildcatter may adopt a policy that makes his conditional for whether to drill or not drill based only on the value of R, but not on the value ofT. In some cases, we can tell from the structure of the graph (w ithout numerical calculations based on the conditionals for the chance nodes) that the best policy based on only some parents will do as well as the best policy based on them all. If some parents are omitted, then the corresponding arrows can be omitted; the graph with these arrows omitted will still be an ID , and once the decision maker has specified all the conditionals, it will be a BN. In general, description and computation in a BN or ID is easier with fewer arrows, so the decision maker would like to omit as many arrows as possible, but he or she may have to make his or her policy depend on all or most of the decision variables' parents in order to optimize the expectation of the value node. Thus the decision maker's objective is to make the policy depend on as few of the parents as possible while still optimizing the expectation of the value node.
Recall that the arrows into chance nodes are called relevance arrows and arrows into decision nodes are called informational arrows.
Informational arrows indicate that the decision maker has certain information, not that he or she must use it. The relevance arrows will all remain in the BN that the decision maker constructs with his or her choice of conditionals for the decision variables, but the decision maker essentially omits informational arrows when he or she chooses a conditional that does not depend on the nodes from which these arro ws come.
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Following Clemen (1991), we distinguish between informational arrows and relevance arrows by representing the former with dashed arr ows while still using solid arrows to represent the latter. Notice that decision variables are treated just like chance variables when they are parents. The difference between an informational and a relevance arr ow depends on the kind of variable the arrow points to, not on the kinds of variables it comes from.
We follow Howard and Matheson (1981) and most of the ID literature in making two additional assumptions:
1. The decisions are all made by a single decision maker who remembers his or her previous decisions. This assumption is represented by the existence of a path in the DAG consisting only of all the decision variables. In other words, the decision variables are ordered, say al,a2, ... ,ak, so that there is an arr ow from ai to ai+t• fori= 1, 2, ... , k-1. We summarize this by saying that the decision variables are completely ordered by the DAG.
The decision maker does not forget any previous
information as he or she progresses through the decisions. This assumption is represented by the existence of an arrow from X to a i whenever there is an arrow from X to ai and i<j. In other words, each decision node inherits the parents of preceding decision nodes. This is called the no-forgetting assumption.
Notice that a decision variable need not inherit the parents of chance variables that precede it. In Figure 1 , for example, there is no arr ow from 0 to D.
We conclude this section with a note on randomization that we include for completeness and that the reader may omit without loss of continuity. Recall that the decision maker can be asked to supply in advance a policy for the decision at each decision variable a . As we discussed above this policy can take the form of a specification of a decision alternative for each configuration of the parents of the decision variable. This policy can also take the form of a probability distribution over the decision alternatives for each configuration of the parents of the decision variable. For example, in Figure 1 , the wildcatter has the option of choosing a probability distribution over the decision alternatives of whether to drill or not drill. In this case a probability distribution must be specified for each configuration of D's parents. For instance, he may decide to drill with probability 113 given T=tl and R=o, with probability 112 given T=tl and R=c, with probability 1/5 given T=t2 and R=o, with probability 9/10 given T=t2 and R=c, and with probability 114 given T=nt and R=nr.
The result of such a policy can be interpreted as a conditional for a given its parents. Again, the decision maker has conditionals for all the variables given their parents, and the ID becomes a BN. The decision maker's objective is still to make the policy depend on as few of the parents as possible while optimizing the expectation of the value node.
However, in optimizing the expectation of the value node, there is no advantage to randomization because of the convexity of the set of probability distributions that can be 
SOLVING INFLUENCE DIAGRAMS
Solution algorithms for IDs can all be described as elaborations of various forms of the principle of optimality in stochastic dynamic programming, which allows us to fmd the decision functions in problems of this type sequentially (Bellman and Dreyfus, 1962) .
In its standard form, the principle of optimality in stochastic dynamic programming applies when we want to maximize or minimize the expectation of a real-valued variable V whose joint distribution with k+ 1 other variables r 0, r 1, ... , r It (which may each be vectors of variables) depends in a stagewise manner on k parameters (which also may be single numbers, vectors or functions) 51, ... , alt. More precisely, we assume that we can factor the joint probability for r 0, r 1, ... , r 1c and v in the form P61, ... ,6t (r0, From this point, we proceed in either of two ways. We can sum or integrate r It out of the expectation. Or we can incorporate r t as part of r t-1 ·
Once again, we assume that we can choose a single value of 5�c_1 so as to optimize simultaneously E6 <VIro ='Yo.r1 = y1, ... ,r1t-2 ='Y�c-2>
Then, as before, the choice of o k-1 can be extended to a choice of (S1, .. . ,Sit _1) to optimize the unconditional expectation So we may also fiX this optimal value of o1H, and reduce the problem further. We can continue in this way, choosing the oi sequentially, provided that the successive simultaneous optimizations like those in (4), (6) This standard version of stochastic dynamic programm ing is not quite adequate for the case of influence diagrams. The reason is that although these diagrams involve factorizations that can be written in the form (3), the factors are not necessaril y conditional probabilities.
The standard version of stochastic dynamic programming can be modified to fit influence diagrams, but there bas been a considerable variety of opinion about bow to do this. The oldest sequential solution algorithm for influence diagrams, the Olmsted-Shacbter reduction algorithm (Olmsted, 1983; Shachter, 1986 ) goes considerably beyond stochastic dynamic programming, in order to maintain a representation of the influence diagram form as the algorithm proceeds. More recent algorithms, including the valuation network algorithm of Sbenoy (1992 and 1993) and the potential influence diagram algorithm of Ndilikilikesba (1992) , stay closer to stochastic dynamic programming.
The simulation algorithm we will describe in Section 5, does not fit exactly into either Sbenoy's or Ndilikilikesba's framework, primarily because their algorithms integrate r k out, while our algorithm follows the second option described above, that of absorbing r k into h11 • We could elaborate one of their frameworks in orderttb make our algorithm fit, but it will be simpler for us to deal directly with the necessary modification in the standard form of stochastic dynamic programm ing that we have just described.
Here is the modification that we require. Let us assume that the joint probability for r 0' r 1 ' ... ' r k and v is proportional to a factorization of the following form Here we do � assume that the factors are conditional probabilities. But we .W assume that the 8i are functions;
and we assume, as the notation indicates, that for fixed values of ro.r t>:· ··r k-1 • the factor b llt l ro . ..r t -1. )' regarded as a function of r k and V, depends on 8k onry through the value Sk assigns to those values of r 0, r 1 , ... , r k-1 . This assumption, as we will see implies that the simultaneous optimizations at each step are possible.
Notice first that the factorization (7) implies that ha (r r ) (rt,vlro, ... ,rt-1),
for ftxed values of r 0,r1 , ... ,r k-1, is at least proportional to the conditional probability distribution for r k and V given these values of r 0 , r 1, ... , r t-1 . To see this, recall that a conditional probability distribution is always proportional to the corresponding joint probability distribution. Thus Whenever a function is proportional to a probability distribution (or probability conditional), it contains all the information needed to find that conditional because the constant of proportionality is simply what is needed to make the function sum (or integrate) to one. .... r t -l ) , ftrst mtegrating 'Yt out tf we wtsh to do so. Thts means replacing the factor in the second line of (7) with a factor where (1) r �t_1 = r k-1 u r k, (2) �k , which is in r k, is now interpreted as a chance node, and
0 ,. 0 . , t.-2 · h� t ( �k lr o, ... ,r k-t}h 11� (r k• VIr o, .. . , r k-1). where s; is the optimal decision function and h � is the zero-one conditional representing s;. In order to fit influence diagrams into this version of stochastic dynamic programming, we write r i for the set of variables consisting of �i together with the chance variables observed by the decision maker between �i and ai+1• for i= 1, ... , k-1, we write ro for the chance variables observed before a1 and r t for the set of variables consisting of li t together with the chance variables (other than V) observed after lit (or never), and we write 8i for the decision function for ai. Then we set h 0(r 0) equal to the product of conditionals for the chance variables in r 0• For i = 1, ... , k-1, we set h11 (r d r 0, ... , r i_1 ) equal to the product of conditionals fo i the chance variables in r i, times the conditional corre sponding to the decision function 8i (recall Formula (2)). And we similarly set h11 (r t• vi r 0, ... ,r t-1) equal to the product of the conditionals for all variables in rt u{ V }. Since h11 (rt,VIr0, ... ,rt_t) depends on at only through its val � 8t(r o ..... r t-1). this puts us in the framework just described.
In the computational theory of Section 5 we will use Gibbs sampling to implement the method just described.
INFORMA TIONIRELEVANCE INFLUENCE DIAGRAMS
In the standard influence diagram, arro ws into a decision node are only informational; they do not represent constraints on what the decision maker can do. We can represent such constraints only indirectly, using arrows to the children of the decision.
Users of influence diagrams often want to represent constraints by arro ws into decision nodes. For example, a user might draw Figure 2 in an attempt to represent the fact that the budget, B, constrains the options for testing and drilling. However, Figure 2 cannot represent such constraints because the dashed arrows are only informational, and the figure does not show B having any relevance to any chance variables. If Figure 2 is interpreted as a standard influence diagram, then variable B will have absolutely no effect on the optimal decision functions; they are the same with or without it 
0---
In order to represent a budget constraint using the standard ID representation, we would have to complicate the diagram of Figure 2 in some way. One way is represented in Figure 3 . Here D' is a deterministic chance node representing whether drilling actually takes place as a function of the budget and the decision maker's decisions. For example, if the possible budget amounts are $1M (million) or $2M (million), the tests costs are $50,000 for testl and $100,000 for test2, and the cost of drilling is $950,000 , then the decision maker cannot drill if B =$1M and T = t2. Using Figure 3 , we can represent this by making D' (whether the drilling really takes place) a deterministic function of B, T and D as follows: (1) The complexity of Figure 3 is obviously undesirable. This suggests that we go beyond the standard ID definitions and allow relevance arrows into decision nodes. Such arr ows would indicate both that the decision maker knows the value of the variables from which these arr ows emanate when he or she makes the decision, and also that the variables constrain the decision.
This suggests the following formal definitions. Definition l. A constraint on a variable X given a set of variables X 1 .... , X k is a mapping Cx from the frame of X 1 , ... , X k to subsets of the frame of X. (In other words, for each configuration x 1 , ... , X k of X 1 , ... , X k , we specify a set Cx(x 1 , ... , X k ) of permitted values for X.) Definition 3. An information/relevance influence diagram (IRID) is a DAG with variables as nodes, some of which are called chance variables and some of which are called decision variables, together with (1) a specification, for each chance node X, of a conditional for X given its parents, and (2) a specification, for each decision node a, of a constraint for a given a subset S a of its parents.
We divide the arr ows into relevance arr ows, which are solid, and informational arrows, which are dashed, as follows:
(1) all arr ows into a chance node X are relevance arr ows, (2) arr ows into a decision node !:t. from parents in Sa are relevance arr ows, and (3) all other arro ws into !:t. are informational arr ows.
Here, as in the case of IDs, we assume that there is a value node: a deterministic chance node which is a sink and is real-valued.
We interpret IRIDs by assuming that when the decision maker makes decision !:t., he or she has observed all the parents of !:t.., including both those from which there are informational arr ows and those from which there are relevance arrows. The relevance arrows indicate information for the decision maker as well as constraints on the decision.
We assume complete ordering and no-forgetting for decision variables:
(1) There is a path in the DAG consisting only of decision variables. (Some or all of the arrows on this path may be relevance arr ows.) (2) If the decision variables, 1:t. 1 , ... , l:t. k , are ordered by the path that joins them and there is an arr ow from X to �. then there is an arrow from X to l:t. j , for all i<j.
(Again, there is no restriction on whether these arr ows are relevance or informational arr ows, or whether one is a relevance arrow and the other is an informational arro w.) Figure 4 shows how the budget constraint for the wildcatter problem can be represented in an IRID. We start with the ID of Figure 2 . We create a chance node for the variable B. Then we draw an informational arr ow from B to T, a relevance arr ow from B to D, and we replace the informational arrow from T to D by a relevance arr ow. Notice that the theory of stochastic dynamic programm ing that applies to IDs also applies to IRIDs; it is simply necessary that each step in the optimization respect the constraints.
SOLVING IRIDS
We begin this section with a review of the simulation algorithm for solving IDs given in Jenzarli (1995) . Then we adopt the algorithm to IRIDs. Finally, we apply the adapted algorithm to the IRID of the oil wildcatter problem. Jenzarli (1995) shows how to use Gibbs sampling (Geman and Geman, 1984; and Gelfand and Smith, 1990) , an iterative Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm (Hastings, 1970) , to implement stochastic dynamic programming for an influence diagram. For an ID with k decision variables !:t.1•···•!:t.k and sets r O •·· ··r k as described in Section 3,
we give a brief summary of the simulation algorithm.
Our task is to find the decision function lit. This means finding, for each configuration ( y 0, y 1, ... , y k-t ) of r0u ... ur�c._1 , the value dt of the decision !:t.k that optimizes Ed (vi r o = 'Yo· r 1 = 'Y1····· r t-1 = 'Yt-1)· (10) (Notice that we write d k in the place of S�r. as a subscript on the expectation operator; this is because the expectation for the configuration (y0 , y1, . . . , 'Yt-1) of the predecessors depends only on the value dk that sk assigns to this configuration.) To this end, we simply compute (10) for all dt and choose the dt that gives the optimal (largest or smallest depending on whether we are maximizing or minimizing) result.
To compute (10) for a particular dt, we recall that the conditional joint disttibution of r t u {V} is proportional to h d k ( rt,V I r o =r0 . ... ,rt _1 =r t-d• which is simply the product of the conditionals for r t u {V}. We now give the steps involved in the computation of (10).
(1) Delete all barren nodes form the ID (Shachter, 1986 (9) When we move on to the next step of the stochastic dynamic program, we use the second of the two options discussed in Section 3. In other words, we absorb r t into r t-1• and we include the conditionals from r t in the new factorization of h11 • In order to avoid zero probabilities that would lii1 terfere with the Gibbs sampling, we do not include the conditional for .dt corresponding to the decision function we have just found for .&t. Instead, we substitute this decision function in all the conditionals in which .& t appeared as a parent, thus eliminating .dt from the graph and producing arrows from the variables on which .dt depends to the variables for which it was a parent.
The algorithm we have just described for IDs also works for IRIDs. The only point to note is that the relevance arr ows into .dt must be included in the graph from which the moral graph is formed. We now apply the algorithm to the IRID of the oil wildcatter problem. Figure 5 Next we do Gibbs sampling with these factors to simulate the posterior disttibution of 0. First, we fix the variables on which D depends, i.e., T, R, and B. Then for every value of 0, we compute V. This gives a sequence of values for V simulating a random sample from its conditional disttibution, from which we may compute its conditional expectation. We perform this step for every value of D, and we choo se the value of D that corre sponds to the maximum conditional expectation of V.
When we move on to the next step of the stochastic dynamic program, we absorb r 2 into r 1 as described in
Step 9 of the algorithm. Then we eliminate D from the graph, thus producing arr ows from T, R, and B to V. The resulting graph is shown in Figure 7 . Finally, we include the conditionals from r 2 in the new factorization of b6 • In order to avoid zero probabilities that would interf� with the Gibbs sampling, we do not include the conditional for D corresponding to the decision function we bave just found for D. Instead, we substitute this decision function in all the conditionals in which D appe ared as a parent.
